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AWhat If I Cannot Make a Difference
ðand Know ItÞ*
Felix Pinkert
When several agents together produce suboptimal outcomes, yet no individual
could have made a difference for the better, Act Consequentialism counter-
intuitively judges that all involved agents act rightly. I address this problem by
supplementing Act Consequentialism with a requirement of modal robustness:
Agents not only ought to produce best consequences in the actual world, but
they also ought to be such that they would act optimally in certain counterfac-
tual scenarios. I interpret this Modally Robust Act Consequentialism as Act Con-
sequentialism plus a requirement of moral virtue, namely, to reliably act rightly
and to act rightly for the right reasons.We often collectively bring about bad outcomes.1 For example, by con-
tinuing to buy cheap supermarket meat, many people together sustain
factory farming, and the greenhouse gas emissions of millions of indi-
viduals together bring about anthropogenic climate change. Intuitively,
these bad outcomes are not just a matter of bad luck, but the result of
some sort of moral shortcoming. Yet in many of these situations, none
of the individual agents could have made any difference for the better.1. When I speak of agents “collectively” or “together” bringing about an outcome, I use
these terms in aminimal sense which only means that the individual actions of those agents
happen to combine to bring about the outcome. I do not assume any sense of collective or
deliberately cooperative action. Likewise, when I speak of collections and groups of agents, I
use to term to include mere agglomerations.
*I am grateful for the helpful comments on earlier versions of this essay from audi-
ences at the Universities of Amsterdam, Munich, Oxford, Princeton, Stirling, and St. An-
drew’s. In particular, I am indebted to Ralf Bader, Marcia Baron, John Broome, Derek Ball,
Mark Budolfson, Krister Bykvist, Cecile Fabre, Hilary Greaves, John Horty, Christian List,
Brian McElwee, Paul McNamara, Tim Mulgan, Philip Pettit, Peter Singer, John Skorupski,
Kai Spiekermann, Martin van Hees, Bill Wringe, and Donald Regan, another referee, and
the editors of Ethics for illuminating comments on this topic.
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ASupermarkets only react to larger changes in demand than individual
customers can effect, and someone choosing to take the train instead of
the plane may not make any morally relevant difference to the climate
if a given threshold of greenhouse gas concentrations will be, or has al-
ready been, exceeded anyway. Consequentialism, at least of the simple
Act Consequentialist type, here seems unable to find fault with anyone,
as no one could have brought about better results by acting differently.
Consequentialists hence face the challenge of somehow still finding fault
with agents for ðmorallyÞ bad results which they together bring about.2
In a recent paper, Shelly Kagan takes up Derek Parfit’s discussion of
such “no-difference cases.” Kagan argues that standard Act Consequen-
tialism can meet this challenge when agents do not know if their con-
tribution will make a difference.3 He further contends that when agents
do know that they cannot make any difference for the better, Act Con-
sequentialists should concede that everyone acts rightly even though all
agents together could have produced better outcomes.4 Julia Nefsky, who
strongly criticizes most other parts of Kagan’s argument in her follow-
up paper, does not take issue with this claim and likewise seems to as-
sume that such cases of full knowledge pose no problem to Act Conse-
quentialism.5
In this essay, I present a working example of agents who together
bring about a collectively suboptimal outcome but who each know that
due to each other’s actions and dispositions, they individually cannot
make any difference for the better ðSec. IÞ. I then argue that contrary to
Kagan’s explicit and Nefsky’s implicit position, we must find something
morally objectionable about some of the agents ðSec. IIÞ. I argue that this
challenge cannot be answered by Kagan’s response, nor by any other
common form of Consequentialism ðSec. IIIÞ, and set aside an unnec-
essarily complicated and controversial solution ðSec. IVÞ. Building on
Donald Regan’s and Michael Zimmerman’s work, I propose further that2. Henceforth, the qualification “morally” is implicit in all claims about the value of
outcomes.
3. Shelly Kagan, “ Do IMake aDifference?,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 39 ð2011Þ: 105–
41; Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons ðOxford: Clarendon, 1984Þ, chap. 3. Thresholds are
only one of several possible reasons why individuals may be unable to make a difference in
situations with multiple agents. The most important other such possible reasons are the
seeming insignificance of small individual contributions ðe.g., in pollution casesÞ, and other
agents’ active frustration of one’s attempts to improve outcomes ðe.g., if other sellers will sell
the weapons which one does not sellÞ. While this essay does not discuss cases of seemingly
insignificant contributions, frustration cases are covered by my proposed solution ðsee
Secs. III.A and VIIÞ.
4. Kagan, “Do I Make a Difference?,” 128.
5. Julia Nefsky, “Consequentialism and the Problem of Collective Harm: A Reply to
Kagan,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 39 ð2012Þ: 364–95.
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Athese cases demand a radically different Consequentialist approach,
according to which agents are required not only to act optimally in the
actual world but also to be agents who would act optimally were others
to act differently ðSec. VÞ. I then show how this “Modally Robust Act
Consequentialism” can be motivated by understanding it as Act Con-
sequentialism plus a requirement of moral virtue ðSec. VIÞ and subse-
quently provide an inductive proof to show that it is a satisfactory re-
sponse for a wide range of cases with any number of agents ðSec. VIIÞ.
Finally, I discuss the limitations of my approach in cases of synchronous
choice and contrast it with Donald Regan’s Co-operative Utilitarianism
ðSec. VIIIÞ.I. THE TWO FACTORIES
Ann and Ben are owners of two factories which are located opposite
each other on a river. Both agents opt for a production process which
releases waste chemicals into the river and thereby kill all the fish in the
river and destroy the livelihood of a fishing community downstream.
The waste from one factory alone would suffice to kill all the fish, and
adding the waste from the other factory does no additional damage what-
soever ðsay, the river flows into the sea where the waste is diluted below
any harmful concentrationÞ. If Ann or Ben were to unilaterally produce
cleanly, this wouldmake their production uncompetitive compared to the
other factory, put them out of business, and destroy the livelihood of their
employees. However, if they both were to produce cleanly, then this prob-
lem would not arise, and both factories would remain in business and the
fishing community would flourish. Ann andBeneach employ 100workers,
the fishing community counts 100 people, and all that matters morally in
this case are the livelihoods of the workers and fishermen. Further, the
only available actions are either to pollute or to produce cleanly. In par-
ticular, Ann and Ben cannot come together and suggest and discuss a
common strategy.6 So far, the case is represented by figure 1.76. I here set this possibility aside because the structure of the problem case can be
reproduced on the level of discussing a strategy: If we assume for each agent that the other
would not cooperate in trying to find a common solution, and that trying to start a dis-
cussion has morally relevant cost, then the payoff structure precisely matches that of the
actions of polluting or producing cleanly. See Sec. VIII.B for a discussion of situations where
agents can communicate.
7. Note that contrary to a typical strategic form game as used in game theory, we here
only write one value per combination of strategies. This is because we are here only inter-
ested in how agents affect overall value, agent-neutrally considered. Thus the relevant
“payoff ” is the same for both agents.
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FIG. 1.—The Two Factories as strategic form game
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AThe two entrepreneurs find themselves in a suboptimal equilib-
rium in a coordination problem: In the two ðNashÞ equilibria where both
agents pollute or produce cleanly, neither Ann nor Ben can improve the
outcome by unilaterally acting differently. But from this fact alone, it
does not yet follow that Act Consequentialism cannot find fault with Ann
and Ben for their actions, because it is not yet clear that they could not
have improved matters by acting differently simpliciter. For example, if
Ann were someone who would produce cleanly if Ben produced cleanly,
then Ben could improve matters by producing cleanly, and Act Con-
sequentialism would judge that Ben acts wrongly by polluting. The Two
Factories becomes a challenge for Act Consequentialism only once we
assume that Ann and Ben are both “uncooperative,” that is, each would
pollute even if the other produced cleanly.8 The additional stipulation
of mutual uncooperativeness is needed because when Act Consequen-
tialism evaluates the consequences of different actions available to an
agent, it also takes into account how other agents would respond to these
actions. In The Two Factories, it is only if both agents are uncooperative
that neither could have improved matters by acting differently and that
Act Consequentialism judges that both act rightly.
Lastly, Ann and Ben are fully aware of this situation. They know all
the relevant facts that determine the consequences of the available ac-
tions, that is, the consequences of the different possible combinations
of their actions and each other’s actions and uncooperativeness. Hence
they know that they individually cannot make a difference for the better
by producing cleanly rather than polluting the river. These additional8. For parallel examples, see Donald Regan, Utilitarianism and Co-operation ðOxford:
Oxford University Press, 1980Þ, 18; Christopher Woodard, Reasons, Patterns, and Cooperation
ðLondon: Routledge, 2008Þ, 47; Michael J. Zimmermann, The Concept of Moral Obligation
ðCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996Þ, 257.
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FIG. 2.—The Two Factories as extensive form game
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Aassumptions of known mutual uncooperativeness are shown by the ex-
tensive form game in figure 2.9
II. CONSEQUENTIALISM AND COLLECTIVELY
SUBOPTIMAL OUTCOMES
Cases like The Two Factories pose the following challenge to Act Con-
sequentialism: Ann and Ben each individually could only have made
matters worse by producing cleanly, as the other agent would then still
have polluted the river, and the livelihoods of 100 workers in the cleanly
producing factory would have been destroyed. Now Act Consequen-
tialism is the following position:
Act Consequentialism: Individual agents morally ought to perform9
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nsidered. Note further that the branches in the tree are meant to represent
ual relations and are not intended to represent any temporal order in which
act. However, as I discuss in Sec. VIII, certain morally desirable counterfactual
esuppose that agents decide sequentially. I am indebted to Krister Bykvist for
me of the importance of tree representations.
order to bypass the controversy about the good ought to be maximized or
ciently much promoted, I stipulate that all discussed suboptimal outcomes are
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ABy calling a failure to bring about optimal outcomes “gratuitous,” I
mean that the failure cannot be explained by mitigating circumstances
due to which we could not expect a given group to collectively act opti-
mally. Typically, such circumstances consist in non-culpable misinforma-
tion or lack of information. Since Ann and Ben know all relevant facts, I
assume that their failure to bring about optimal outcomes is gratuitous.11
On-the-hook is a widely shared assumption in the philosophical dis-
cussion of Consequentialism and no-difference cases. Donald Regan’s
Prop-COP is themirror image of On-the-hook, andMichael Zimmerman
endorses the same claim, as does Derek Parfit in his discussion of collec-
tively self-defeating moral principles. Shelly Kagan’s and Julia Nefsky’s re-
cent discussions of no-difference cases are likewise motivated by an intu-
ition along the lines of On-the-hook.12
On-the-hook is commonly defended along the following lines: The
fundamental assumption of Consequentialism is that the right ði.e., the
deontic status of actionsÞ is solely determined by the good ði.e., by dif-
ferences made to overall value in the worldÞ. In light of this connection,
however, it should not be possible for each of us to act rightly while we
together fail to produce optimal outcomes.13 However, this motivation
for On-the-hook is problematic, since it presupposes a Collective Con-
sequentialist interpretation of the core Consequentialist position. Ac-
cording to this interpretation, the difference made that all agents can
make together bears on the moral status of individuals’ actions. Since
this interpretation is denied by Act Consequentialists, basing On-the-
hook on this interpretation already assumes that Act Consequentialism
is mistaken. On pain of circularity, On-the-hook can then not pose a
further challenge to Act Consequentialism.
I contend that for this reason, On-the-hook should not be under-
stood as a specifically Consequentialist position. Instead, it should be
understood as the contraposition of a second-order claim about mo-
rality in general and, hence, as a desideratum for any moral principle.
According to this claim, the relation betweenmorality and overall value is
such that if everyone always satisfied all requirements posed on them by11. See the conclusion for cases with excusable collectively suboptimal outcomes.
12. Nefsky, “Consequentialism and the Problem of Collective Harm”; Kagan, “Do I
Make a Difference?”; Regan, Utilitarianism and Co-operation, 4–5; Parfit, Reasons and Persons,
55–59; Zimmermann, Moral Obligation, chap. 9.
13. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 54. See also Kagan, “Do I Make a Difference?,” 108;
Regan, Utilitarianism and Co-operation, 18–21; Woodard, Reasons, Patterns, and Cooperation,
45–47; and Zimmermann, Moral Obligation, 257–58.
so bad and so strongly suboptimal that even satisficing Consequentialists would concede
that some fault needs to be found. Note further that “finding fault with” is always meant as a
shorthand for “identifying morally objectionable facts about,” and is not meant to carry any
connotations of blameworthiness.
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Amorality, the world would be as good as it can be ðas far as agents’ in-
fluence is concernedÞ. Whether or not these requirements are in any
way determined by consequences, they “conspire” to direct all agents
together toward the best outcomes they collectively can bring about.14
Conversely, if collectively optimal outcomes are not produced, at least
one agent must fall short of satisfying all the requirements of moral-
ity. When it is restricted to wrong action, as done by Kagan, Nefsky, and
Parfit, On-the-hook captures the intuitive idea that it should not be pos-
sible for everyone to act rightly, yet for everyone together not to bring
about optimal outcomes. I instead use a more general formulation of
On-the-hook because, as I shall argue below, such an exclusive focus on
actions as bearers of negative moral evaluation is misguided.
Thus understood, On-the-hook has considerable intuitive appeal,
and a moral principle which can accommodate this intuition is, other
things equal, strongly preferable to a moral principle that cannot ac-
commodate it. So while I follow Kagan’s claim that Act Consequential-
ists should see little appeal in condemning actions that are known to
make the world no worse ðsee Sec. III.BÞ, I hold that they should inves-
tigate other ways to accommodate On-the-hook. The extended form of
Act Consequentialism which I propose is superior to Act Consequential-
ism and all other Consequentialist principles because it meets the chal-
lenge of accommodating On-the-hook without introducing any new
problems. Before turning to my own proposal, however, I first discuss
and reject two prominent nonsolutions and an unnecessarily compli-
cated and controversial solution to this challenge.
III. NONSOLUTIONS
A. Subjective Act Consequentialism
Kagan offers a solution for those no-difference cases where agents do
not know if their contribution will make a difference. Such situations
typically arise when agents do not know the precise level of the threshold
at which an additional contribution would make a difference, or they do
not know how many other agents will contribute. According to Kagan,
such cases call for a subjective Act Consequentialist assessment, where
the deontic status of actions is determined not by actual but by expected
consequences.15 Now while this solution is effective for the cases Kagan14. For the related “principle of moral harmony,” which holds that moral obligations
conspire to direct agents to collectively maximize a given group’s welfare, see Fred Feld-
man, Doing the Best We Can: An Essay in Informal Deontic Logic ðDordrecht: Reidel, 1986Þ,
chap. 7, and “The Principle of Moral Harmony,” Journal of Philosophy 77 ð1980Þ: 166–79.
15. Kagan, “Do I Make a Difference?,” 125–27. Essentially the same argument is also
advocated by Peter Singer, “Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism,” Philosophy and Public Affairs
9 ð1980Þ: 325–37, 335–36.
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Aconsiders, it does not apply to cases like The Two Factories, where the
involved agents know that they cannot make a difference by acting dif-
ferently. Here objective and subjective Act Consequentialism both judge
that Ann and Ben each act rightly, and hence both moral principles fail
to accommodate On-the-hook.
Kagan argues that this limitation of subjective Act Consequential-
ism is unproblematic because no-difference cases where agents know
that they in fact cannot make a difference are rare and unrealistic. I con-
tend that this claim is mistaken and that Kagan is misled by focusing
on ordinary consumer choice and his unrealistic example of the Friends
of Chicken Consumption—an organization which informs customers
when their purchase of a chicken will not make any difference to the
number of factory-farmed chicken in the world.16 By contrast, realistic
examples of no-difference cases with full knowledge are market situa-
tions where supply or demand of some good is known to be inelastic over
a range of prices. Buyers and sellers then know that were they to stop
participating, others would step in and compensate by taking over their
transactions.
To give an example of price-inelastic demand, the number of weap-
ons bought by a rich warlord and distributed to child soldiers is arguably
determined largely by strategic considerations and the number of avail-
able children and is constant over a range of prices. Every individual weap-
ons supplier can know that if they decide not to sell to the warlord, then
another supplier will sell instead. With one supplier less in themarket, the
price of weapons may rise slightly, but this will not affect the total number
of weapons bought nor the harm done to the child soldiers and to who-
ever gets into their way.17 The same considerations hold for dealers sell-
ing highly addictive drugs. Examples of markets with price-inelastic sup-
ply are the purchasing of natural resources from conflict regions and
ðotherÞ stolen goods. Unless Consequentialists are willing to bite the bul-
let and hold that there is nothing morally objectionable about agents on
the price-elastic side of these collectively harmful and morally highly prob-
lematic transactions ði.e., those agents who cannot affect the amount of
goods tradedÞ, they must meet the challenge of accommodating On-the-
hook in no-difference cases with full knowledge.
B. Collective Consequentialism
One way to accommodate On-the-hook is to move away from Act Con-
sequentialism to Collective Consequentialist moral principles. In deter-
mining what we individually ought to do, Collective Consequentialist16. Kagan, “Do I Make a Difference?,” 127–28.
17. The most likely response of the rich warlord to rising weapons prices is to reduce
personal expenditure. This might make the warlord do less environmental damage by lux
urious living, but this damage clearly is not the main reason for condemning such weap
ons sales.
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Aprinciples consider the consequences of what we together can do. Ex-
amples of such principles are Consequentialist Generalization ðwhich
holds that agents ought to do what would have best consequences if ev-
eryone did itÞ and simple compliance-basedRuleConsequentialism ðwhich
holds that agents ought to act in conformance with the set of rules which is
such that if everyone complied with it, best consequences would ensueÞ.
These simple Collective Consequentialist principles accommodate On-the-
hook by judging that Ann and Ben both act wrongly by polluting.
This achievement, however, comes at the price of judging that Ann
and Ben each ought to unilaterally produce cleanly even though the
other agent would then still pollute. Simple Collective Consequentialist
principles then implausibly require Ann and Ben to perform actions which
are known to produce no good and to destroy the livelihoods of 100 em-
ployees. I contend that a principle that accommodates On-the-hook by
giving such reckless verdicts is not to be preferred over Act Consequen-
tialism, which fails to accommodate On-the-hook but at least does not
require agents to act recklessly.
These reckless verdicts can be avoided by moving to more sophis-
ticated Collective Consequentialist principles, for example, by including
caveats against recklessness or factoring in both the differences that we
individually and that we together could make.18 This response, however,
boils down to modifying the principles to imply that Ann and Ben are
not required to unilaterally produce cleanly and hence act rightly by
polluting. Collective Consequentialists can thus avoid reckless verdicts
only at the cost of not accommodating On-the-hook. The appropriate
Consequentialist response to this dilemma then seems to be to opt for
the lesser evil, namely, to not accommodate On-the-hook.
IV. A SOLUTION WITH BAGGAGE: COLLECTIVE WRONGNESS
The above dilemma occurs because so far, we have only considered Ann’s
and Ben’s individual actions as potential bearers of moral fault, and these
actions can only be either permitted or prohibited. Consequently, the only
way to avoid the dilemma is to allow for objectionable facts about Ann and
Ben which do not concern their individual actions of polluting.19 A
promising approach to extend the scope of moral evaluation is to let Act
Consequentialism cover not only individual actions but also conjunc-
tions of such actions across agents. According to this view, first proposed
by Betsy Postow and Derek Parfit, it is Ann and Ben together who act18. See, e.g., TimMulgan, The Demands of Consequentialism ðOxford: Clarendon, 2001Þ,
60; Woodard, Reasons, Patterns, and Cooperation, 107–11.
19. This is the essence of the negative conclusion of Donald Regan’s argument
that no exclusively act-oriented moral principle can be fully adaptive ðUtilitarianism and Co-
operation, 105–23Þ.
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Awrongly by both polluting, because together they could have brought
about better outcomes.20 Because asserting such collective wrongness is
consistent with saying that Ann and Ben individually both act rightly by
polluting, this position avoids the recklessness problem.
Whether this view also satisfactorily accommodates On-the-hook,
however, is questionable. In its rough formulation so far, Ann and Ben
individually are let off the hook, as there is nothing for which we could
reproach either of them on their own. This problematic responsibility
gap can be amended by stipulating that the collective wrongness reflects
on Ann and Ben individually. On such a view, Ann and Ben act rightly
qua individuals, but there is something wrong about them qua members
of the group they constitute, due to the wrongdoing of that group.21
This version of the collective wrongness response, however, over-
shoots the target. Consider a variant of The Two Factories where Ben is
uncooperative but Ann is cooperative. As far as Ann is concerned, the
overall pollution is avoidable, as she would not pollute if Ben did not
pollute either. However, Ben will pollute anyway, the fishermen still lose
their livelihood, and Ann and Ben collectively act wrongly. It then seems
implausible to hold that this fault reflects on Ann: After all, by being
ready to bring about the collectively optimal outcome, she already does
all that she can be expected to do. Furthermore, her fault qua member
of the group of Ann and Ben together would arise solely from Ben’s
uncooperativeness. Ann’s moral fault would then depend exclusively on
facts about another agent, and Ann could not have avoided a moral
deficiency even with her best efforts and intentions. This implication
contradicts ought implies can and should thus be rejected.22
Consequently, for the collective wrongness response to be plausible,
collective wrongness must reflect on individuals more selectively. The
above discussion shows that we must discriminate between cooperative
and uncooperative agents: Ben’s uncooperativeness allows us to say that20. Derek Parfit, “What We Together Do” ðunpublished ms., 1988Þ, 7; Betsy Carol
Postow, “Generalized Act Utilitarianism,” Analysis 37 ð1977Þ: 49–52.
21. See, e.g., Christian List and Philip Pettit, Group Agency ðOxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011Þ, 164; Marion Smiley, “Collective Responsibility,” inThe Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, ed. EdwardN. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/collective
-responsibility.
22. In such cases of unilateral uncooperativeness, Act Consequentialism can actually
find fault with Ben, without any reference to collective wrongdoing: Because Ann is co-
operative and would produce cleanly if Ben produced cleanly, Ben’s action of polluting the
river is suboptimal. So one could restrict the collective wrongdoing approach to account
for cases of mutual uncooperativeness like The Two Factories where Act Consequential-
ism cannot find fault with either Ann or Ben, and could leave the remaining cases to be
tackled by standard Act Consequentialism. However, such a patchwork approach seems im-
plausibly gerrymandered. Furthermore, because the collective wrongdoing approach goes
amiss in cases of unilateral uncooperativeness, the worry arises that even in cases of mutual
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Athe collective wrongness reflects negatively on him, while the coopera-
tive Ann must be let off the hook.23
In this improved form, the collective wrongness approach still relies
on highly controversial ascriptions of collective wrongness and hence
collective obligations. Even if we grant that some collectives of agents
can be subject to moral obligations, it is highly doubtful that just any odd
collection of agents can be subject to moral requirements. In order for the
approach to fully accommodate On-the-hook, it would have to be shown
that all cases of gratuitous failure to bring about collectively optimal out-
comes are also cases where collective wrongness can correctly be attributed
to the group in question.
I am doubtful that this challenge can be met. But rather than press-
ing this point further, in the following section I provide a solution that is
superior either way.My proposal follows the improved collective wrongness
approach by identifying agents’ cooperativeness and uncooperativeness as
facts that matter to the moral evaluation of these agents. However, my ap-
proachcondemnsagents’uncooperativenessdirectly, asopposed toviewing
uncooperativeness as a mere conduit through which collective wrongness
reflects on individuals. My approach thus bypasses the controversies that
come along with referring to collective wrongness and has the further
virtue of simplicity.V. A BETTER SOLUTION: EVALUATING WHAT
AGENTS WOULD HAVE DONE
Recall that it is Ben’s uncooperativeness that makes Ann’s act of pollu-
tion rightful, and vice versa. This is because by being agents who would
pollute even if the other agent produced cleanly, Ann and Ben make it
impossible for each other to achieve better outcomes by acting differ-
ently. A moral principle that condemns such uncooperativeness then
finds fault in cases where Act Consequentialism cannot do so.24 If Act
Consequentialism is supplemented with such a principle, then it always23. Note that the same qualifications would have to be added to a collective wrongness
approach that does not evaluate Ann’s and Ben’s actions as a collective but other facts
about them collectively.
uncooperativeness where this approach gives the right verdicts, it does so for the wrong
reasons.
The possibility of inescapable fault qua member of a collective that acts wrongly
will not worry those who are at ease with “metaphysical guilt” that one bears solely in virtue
of one’smembership in a blameworthy collective ðSmiley, “CollectiveResponsibility,” sec. 4Þ.
This position, however, is rare, and at any rate not mine.
24. In line with widening the scope of moral assessment beyond actions, I extend the
use of the term “moral principle” to also cover general moral claims about what disposi-
tions and characters agents ought to have.
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Afinds fault when a group of agents fails to achieve collectively optimal
outcomes—or so I will argue in the following.25
Now Ben’s uncooperativeness means that even if Ann were to
produce cleanly, Ben would not produce cleanly as well. In this coun-
terfactual situation, Ben would act suboptimally, as he then could pro-
duce better outcomes by producing cleanly as well.26 Hence while Ben
satisfies the requirements of Act Consequentialism in the actual world,
he would violate them in the counterfactual situation where Ann pro-
duces cleanly ðand vice versa for AnnÞ.
This connection between uncooperativeness and counterfactual
violations of the requirements of Act Consequentialism holds gener-
ally: Abstracting fromThe Two Factories, call an agent “uncooperative” if
she performs actions and has dispositions to act which make it impos-
sible for others to bring about collectively optimal outcomes. For an
agent to be uncooperative, it must hold that were all others to play their
part in an optimal collective response, the uncooperative agent would,
actively or passively, frustrate this attempt to reach a collectively optimal
outcome. By doing so, the uncooperative agent would act suboptimally,
because her actions would bring about a less good outcome than the
collectively optimal outcome that would otherwise be produced. Hence
the uncooperative agent would violate the requirements of Act Conse-
quentialism.
Because of this connection between uncooperativeness and Act
Consequentialism, we can capture the moral fault that is in play in The
Two Factories by supplementing Act Consequentialism with a require-
ment of modal robustness, that is, a requirement to act according to
the demands of Act Consequentialism not just in the actual world but
also in certain counterfactual scenarios.27 More precisely, the resulting
requirement reads:2
requi
optim
fied,
view i
proof
2
outco
bring
2
dema
ll use Modally Robust Act Consequentialism: An agent ought to act op-
timally in the actual world, and be such that for all possible com-
binations of the actions of other agents, if that combination were
instantiated, she would act optimally in these circumstances.5. My proposed solution is in part inspired by Michael Zimmerman’s “openness”
rement, which holds that agents ought to leave it up to others whether collectively
al outcomes will be produced ðZimmermann, Moral Obligation, 263Þ. Properly speci-
Zimmerman’s and my own views are extensionally equivalent, but I contend that my
s more straightforward, more easily motivated, and more suitable for generalization
s. Also,my view fares better in situations of limited knowledge, as discussed in Sec. VIII.
6. As a terminological simplification, let the term “optimal” not only refer to best
mes but also to actions or combinations of actions that among all relevant alternatives
about optimal outcomes ðand analogously for “suboptimal”Þ.
7. This formulation is adapted from Philip Pettit’s 2011 Uheiro lectures on robustly
nding values or goods. Here, the idea is that values such as friendship do not just
This content downloaded from 217.112.157.113 on May 04, 2016 06:25:13 AM
subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Pinkert What If I Cannot Make a Difference 983
AModally Robust Act Consequentialism accommodates On-the-hook in
The Two Factories: Ann’s uncooperativeness means that in counterfac-
tual situations where Ben produces cleanly, Ann would act suboptimally,
and likewise for Ben. Furthermore, this violation of the requirements of
Modally Robust Act Consequentialism explains the suboptimal outcome,
because universal satisfaction of the requirements of Modally Robust Act
Consequentialism would have guaranteed collectively optimal outcomes,
as follows: First, the modal robustness part of this principle requires Ann
to be such that she would produce cleanly if Ben did, and vice versa. If
both agents satisfy this requirement, then the Act Consequentialism part
of the principle requires each agent to produce cleanly. If they also sat-
isfy this further requirement, then they both produce cleanly, thereby
producing collectively optimal outcomes. Conversely, if Ann and Ben do
not produce collectively optimal outcomes, then this fact is explained by
at least one of them violating the requirements of Modally Robust Act
Consequentialism.
To strengthen the case for Modally Robust Act Consequentialism,
in the following two sections I, first, independently motivate Modally Ro-
bust Act Consequentialism and, second, show that it accommodates On-
the-hook not just in The Two Factories but in a wide range of cases. From
here on, I use the adjective “cooperative” to refer to agents who satisfy
the requirements of Modally Robust Act Consequentialism in a given sit-
uation and analogously for “uncooperative.”VI. MOTIVATING MODALLY ROBUST ACT CONSEQUENTIALISM
So far, I have supplemented Act Consequentialism with a modal robust-
ness clause and have argued that the resulting Modally Robust Act Con-
sequentialism accommodates On-the-hook in The Two Factories. In this
section, I provide an independent motivation for Modally Robust Act
Consequentialism. I argue that agents who satisfy the requirements of
Modally Robust Act Consequentialism thereby display an important as-
pect of morally good or virtuous character, viewed from a Consequen-
tialist perspective.A. Consequentialist Virtue and Global Consequentialism
The position I advocate differs crucially from a common Consequential-
ist reading of moral virtue which evaluates dispositions and characterrequire certain behavior in the actual world but also in counterfactual scenarios. My pro-
posal differs by applying the idea of modal robustness to moral requirements and hence
moral rightness.
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Atraits from a Global Consequentialist perspective.28 On an individual-
based form of Global Consequentialism, an agent’s virtues are those
dispositions and character traits which are optimal for her to have. As I
show in the following, Modally Robust Act Consequentialism makes more
stringent requirements on agents’ dispositions than such a Global Con-
sequentialism. Consequently, this kind of Global Consequentialist virtue
does not capture the requirements of Modally Robust Act Consequential-
ism and, as I shall argue, is insufficient for fully accommodating On-the-
hook in cases where Act Consequentialism on its own cannot find fault. I
further show that if Global Consequentialism is modified to remedy this
defect, the resulting position is implausible and hard to defend in its own
right.
To begin with, note that by satisfying the requirements of Mod-
ally Robust Act Consequentialism, an individual agent does not always
produce better outcomes than by displaying other dispositions. For ex-
ample, in The Two Factories, outcomes would not be improved if Ann
was cooperative and thereby satisfied the requirements of Modally Ro-
bust Act Consequentialism. This is because due to the fact that Ben
uncooperatively pollutes the river, a cooperative Ann has to pollute as
well if she is to save the livelihoods of her employees. The only differ-
ence between a cooperative and uncooperative Ann is that the former
would make better outcomes available to Ben. But doing so would not
make the world any better, as Ben would not use that new possibility.
Hence, contrary to Modally Robust Act Consequentialism, individual-
based Global Consequentialism here does not require Ann and Ben to
be cooperative rather than uncooperative and also does not find fault
with either of them.
The Global Consequentialist about virtue can respond by holding
that dispositions need to be evaluated not in single choice situations
but over longer time periods. Virtues are then those dispositions of an
agent which in the long run lead to best outcomes. However, on this
view, Modally Robust Act Consequentialism and individual-based Global
Consequentialist virtue still come apart: First, if agents can have very
fine-grained dispositions, then there are many competing possible dis-
positions that have just as good consequences as satisfying Modally Ro-
bust Act Consequentialism. For example, suppose that Ann and Ben are
always cooperative except in The Two Factories. Because unilateral co-
operativeness in The Two Factories does not make the world any better,28. See, e.g., JuliaDriver,Uneasy Virtue ðCambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 2001Þ,
67, 72; Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 24–26; and Philip Pettit andMichael Smith, “Global Con-
sequentialism,” inMorality, Rules and Consequences: A Critical Reader, ed. Brad Hooker, Elinor
Mason, and Dale E. Miller ðEdinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000Þ, 121–33, 121.
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Athese dispositions have just as good consequences as fully satisfying the
demands of Modally Robust Act Consequentialism. So individual-based
Global Consequentialism cannot find fault with Ann and Ben for hav-
ing these dispositions rather than satisfying the requirements of Modally
Robust Act Consequentialism. It thus comes apart from Modally Robust
Act Consequentialism and does not accommodate On-the-hook.
Second, even if we do not allow for extremely fine-grained disposi-
tions, whether satisfying the demands of Modally Robust Act Conse-
quentialism produces better outcomes in the long run than alternative
dispositions depends on the prevalence of cooperativeness in other agents.
If everyone were always disposed to frustrate any attempts to bring about
better outcomes, then a wide range of choice situations would be similar to
The Two Factories. Unilateral cooperativeness would then not bring about
better outcomes than a range of alternative dispositions. Contrary to Mod-
ally Robust Act Consequentialism, individual-based Global Consequen-
tialism would then not require agents to always be cooperative and, hence,
cannot accommodate On-the-hook in such situations.
Lastly, Global Consequentialists can avoid these limitations by un-
derstanding virtues as those dispositions which it would be optimal for
everyone to have. On this account, the requirements of Modally Ro-
bust Act Consequentialism are also requirements of virtue, because ðas
I will argue in the next sectionÞ, universal satisfaction of the require-
ments of Modally Robust Act Consequentialism by all members of a col-
lective guarantees collectively optimal outcomes. The downside of this
view is that Modally Robust Act Consequentialism would then be moti-
vated along Collective Global Consequentialist lines, which is an unat-
tractive ad hoc patchwork of two theories that is hard to motivate: On
this view, the deontic status of an agent’s actions is solely determined
by the consequences of that individual agent’s actions, while the moral
quality of her character traits is solely determined by the consequences
of everyone having such traits. It is not clear why consequences should
matter in such different ways when we assess actions and when we assess
character.
B. Virtue and Responsiveness to Value
The alternative picture of the relation between Modally Robust Act
Consequentialism and virtue starts from an independently plausible
claim about the goodness of agents’ characters. This claim holds that
there is something better about agents who reliably act morally and are
sensitive to those facts which are morally relevant than about agents who
merely always perform the right action. This claim is independent of Act
Consequentialism, and any moral principle can be supplemented by a
modal robustness requirement: If a givenmoral principle is the rightmoralThis content downloaded from 217.112.157.113 on May 04, 2016 06:25:13 AM
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Aprinciple, then there is something good about not just in fact satisfying
the demands of that principle but in reliably doing so.
The value of such reliability is complemented by the value of the
mental states that come along with it. Typically, agents reliably act rightly
when they act for the right reasons, that is, when they “appropriately”
and “effectively” take into consideration those facts which the moral prin-
ciple identifies as morally relevant reasons that determine their moral ob-
ligations. Agents appropriately take into consideration the right reasons
when they accurately assess their normative situation and care for the rel-
evant reasons. They effectively take these reasons into consideration when
this assessment translates into right action, as opposed to being hindered
from doing so by weakness of will. When agents take the relevant reasons
into account in this way, then their satisfaction of the demands of morality
is not coincidental or morally lucky, and they would reliably satisfy these
demands in various counterfactual scenarios. Hence modal robustness
of acting rightly is arguably something good about an agent, due to the
value both of reliably acting rightly and of the associated mental states
that come along with such reliable right acting.29 A requirement to mod-
ally robustly acting rightly can then be understood as a requirement of
virtue: If an agent is to be virtuous, then they must display such modal
robustness.
These claims about the goodness of agents’ characters and the re-
quirements of virtue holds nomatter what specificmoral principle is true:
A moral principle like Act Consequentialism simply adds an account of
which facts are the morally relevant reasons to which agents must be
sensitive. The requirement of modal robustness is thus understood as a
requirement additional to Consequentialist considerations. In particu-
lar, it is not a requirement of Consequentialism, that is, the claim is not
that agents ought to display modal robustness because they thereby in-
crease value ðin the form of good characterÞ in the world. Instead, con-
siderations of virtue are an independent source of requirements on
agents’ characters.
Modally Robust Act Consequentialism understood in these terms
has two attractive features. First, the moral defect manifested by unco-
operative agents is distinct from morally wrong action: Just as a person
with a psychopathic disorder might get through life without violating any
deontological requirements, so uncooperative agents might be morally
lucky and in fact always act optimally and according to Act Consequen-
tialism rightly. Thus a requirement to be a morally good agent in this re-
spect stands next to the initial Act Consequentialist moral principle that29. For the value claim about acting for the right reasons, see Alison Hills, “Moral
Testimony and Moral Epistemology,” Ethics 120 ð2009Þ: 94–127, 108.
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Aconcerns right action.30 It is this twofold moral assessment which en-
ables Modally Robust Act Consequentialism to accommodate On-the-
hook while avoiding reckless verdicts. Second, Modally Robust Act Con-
sequentialism does not consider any more facts as morally relevant than
Act Consequentialism does, as it holds that the only morally relevant rea-
sons are the consequences of individuals’ actions. Modally Robust Act Con-
sequentialism interpreted as a requirement of moral virtue only adds the
second-order requirement for agents to appropriately and effectively care
about these very same reasons, and thus has the virtue of theoretical sim-
plicity.
Modally Robust Act Consequentialism,motivated by appeal tomoral
virtue, then responds to the challenge of accommodating On-the-hook
in The Two Factories as follows: Under mutual uncooperativeness, Ann
and Ben each act rightly by polluting the river, because only in this way
can they remain competitive and maintain the livelihoods of their work-
ers. However, their uncooperativeness shows that there is something
wrong with them as moral agents: They do not satisfy the demands of
Act Consequentialism modally robustly, and this shows that they do not
appropriately and effectively care about the livelihoods of the workers
and fishermen. Because according to Act Consequentialism, the extent
to which actions promote the good is the supreme ðand onlyÞ moral
consideration, and since a world with more people having livelihoods is
better than a world with fewer people having livelihoods, Ann and Ben
thus each individually show a morally problematic character trait.
C. Problems with Being Responsive to Value
The above connection between Modally Robust Act Consequentialism
and moral virtue, however, is subject to a number of complications, which
I can only outline here.31 I have contrasted my approach with a Global
Consequentialist approach and have argued that virtue is an independent
source of requirements on agents’ characters. However, even if one does
not adopt a Global Consequentialist perspective, one can still assess char-
acter traits with regard to their instrumental value, for example, when one
asks which character traits an agent ought to develop. Now it is common-
place that consciously caring for maximizing the good can have bad con-
sequences. For example, it may disable one from living meaningful per-
sonal relationships or developing long-term commitments to projects
whose value can only be realized if agents forgo constant reevaluation of
their commitment. Conversely, dispositions other than caring for maxi-
mizing the good can have superior consequences. For example, aversion
to killing can lead one to act suboptimally in some situations, but for30. I am indebted to Brian McElwee for stressing this point.
31. I am grateful to Julia Driver for insisting on the importance of these complications.
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Amost agents, such a disposition arguably has good consequences in the
long run.32 With regard to environmental coordination problems, Dale
Jamieson has argued for countervailing considerations against counter-
factual sensitivity towardothers’ actions.According to Jamieson, attempting
to track others’ actions and to calculate a precisely optimal course of ac-
tion systematically leads to failure in large-scale coordinationproblems, due
to moral hazard and negative psychological effects like cynicism.33 In re-
sponse to this problem, Jamieson argues, agents should reduce their indi-
vidual contributions to environmental problems irrespective of what others
do, even at the cost of not acting optimally in the actual world.34
Due to space limitations, I can only hint at an approach to this
interplay between the requirements of virtue and the instrumental value
of dispositions other than modally robust optimal action. I suggest that
the concept of pro tanto requirements of virtue and higher-order car-
ing for the good may be of help here. According this tentative view,
on the “ground level” of agents’ deliberation about actions, the require-
ment of virtue to appropriately and effectively care for the good is only
a pro tanto requirement that can be outweighed by countervailing in-
strumental considerations against thinking in terms of maximizing the
good. However, if Act Consequentialist is the correct account of the mor-
ally relevant reasons, then for agents to be fully virtuous, at some level of
deliberation ðe.g., when they deliberate about which character to developÞ,
they must appropriately and effectively care for the good.35 Otherwise,
there would be a strange disconnect between the fundamental morally
relevant reasons andmorally virtuous agents.
In the following, I set these complications aside, and understand
Modally Robust Act Consequentialism as Act Consequentialism plus an
all-things-considered requirement of virtue to be a morally good agent
by appropriately and effectively caring about maximizing the good. Just
as people with psychopathic disorders who are insusceptible to typically
deontological reasons are defective moral agents from a deontological
standpoint, so uncooperative agents who do not appropriately and ef-32. See Driver, Uneasy Virtue, 73.
33. Dale Jamieson, “When Utilitarians Should Be Virtue Theorists,” Utilitas 19 ð2007Þ:
160–83, 167.
34. Jamieson’s position is plausible because the negative effect of unilateral coopera-
tive action is very small in the cases he discusses. For example, the moral cost of driving a
smaller car even when everyone else keeps emitting too much carbon dioxide is very small,
and is solely incurred by the cooperative agent. However, as The Two Factories shows, the
cost of unilateral cooperativeness can bemuchhigher, and in the case of institutional actors,
the psychological effects discussed by Jamieson are likely to be less problematic. Moreover,
it is hard to conceive of cases where additional considerations favor uncooperativeness, for
example, to pollute no matter what others do.
35. There can still be virtuous agents who have the right ground-level dispositions but
never thought about the overall good—only these agents are not as virtues as agents can be.
This content downloaded from 217.112.157.113 on May 04, 2016 06:25:13 AM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Pinkert What If I Cannot Make a Difference 989
Afectively care about promoting the good are then defective moral agents
from a Consequentialist perspective.
VII. GENERALIZATION ABOUT MODALLY ROBUST ACT
CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ON-THE-HOOK
As argued above, Modally Robust Act Consequentialism accommodates
On-the-hook in the specific case of The Two Factories. However, there is
a vast range of possible cases where several agents each have arbitrarily
many options for acting and where they together gratuitously achieve
only collectively suboptimal outcomes. In many of these cases, no indi-
vidual could make any difference for the better by acting differently. If
Modally Robust Act Consequentialism is to be a real improvement over
Act Consequentialism in terms of accommodating On-the-hook, it must
always find some moral fault in such no-difference cases. In this section,
I prove that under certain epistemic assumptions, Modally Robust Act
Consequentialism meets this requirement.
My proof proceeds by induction: I first show thatModally Robust Act
Consequentialism always finds fault when two agents gratuitously bring
about collectively suboptimal outcomes. Second, I show that if Modally
Robust Act Consequentialism always finds fault in situations where some
number n of agents gratuitously bring about collectively suboptimal out-
comes, then it also does so in all situationswithn1 1 agents. By induction,
it then follows that the same claim holds in all situations with n ≥1 agents.
A. Induction Start: Modally Robust Act Consequentialism
in Situations with Two Agents
First, I establish the Induction Start, that is, the claim that Modally Ro-
bust Act Consequentialism always finds fault in any situation where two
agents gratuitously achieve only collectively suboptimal outcomes, irre-
spective of the magnitude and distribution of outcomes, the number of
optimal collective responses, and the number of actions that are avail-
able to each agent. So consider a case where two agents together gratu-
itously achieve only a collectively suboptimal outcome. Consider further
all the different combinations of actions of the two agents which would
have brought about an optimal outcome. Call all actions of a given agent
which feature in at least one such optimal collective response her “po-
tentially cooperative” actions. By contrast, “uncooperative actions” are
actions which do not feature in any optimal collective response.
If there is only one optimal collective response, then each agent has
only one potentially cooperative action available to her. Since only sub-
optimal outcomes are produced, it must hold that at least one of the
agents performs an uncooperative action and must therefore have had a
potentially cooperative action available to her which she does not per-This content downloaded from 217.112.157.113 on May 04, 2016 06:25:13 AM
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Aform. If there is more than one optimal collective response, then at least
one of the agents has more than one potentially cooperative action avail-
able to her. In both cases, there is at least one agent who has had a po-
tentially cooperative action available to her that she does not in fact per-
form, either because she performs an uncooperative action or because
she performs another potentially cooperative action.
Now consider an agent a who could have performed such a ðdiffer-
entÞ potentially cooperative action Jc rather than the action Ja that she
actually performs, and ask whether she acted optimally by performing Ja:ll use 1. If she does not act optimally, then according to Act Consequen-
tialism, she acts wrongly. A fortiori, Modally Robust Act Con-
sequentialism finds fault with her.
2. If she does act optimally, then it must hold that had she per-
formed the potentially cooperative action Jc, outcomes would
not have been better than the actual collectively suboptimal
outcome. So had she performed Jc, this would not have led to an
optimal collective response. This is only possible if the other agent
b would then not have performed a potentially cooperative action
that would have completed an optimal collective response.Hence
agent b would not have acted optimally in this counterfactual sce-
nario. It follows that Modally Robust Act Consequentialism finds
fault with agent b.Hence either way, Modally Robust Act Consequentialism finds fault with
at least one agent if a group of two agents gratuitously fails to produce
collectively optimal outcomes.
B. Induction Step from n to n11 Agents
At this point of the argument, we need to make more precise the as-
sumption that agents know all relevant facts, as follows:Modally Robust Knowledge: The involved agents know all relevant
facts. If others acted differently, they would still have such knowl-
edge, and this knowledge would likewise be modally robust.The modal robustness requirement on agents’ knowledge means that the
agents cannot affect the quality of each others’ epistemic positions, that is,
deception or misleading each other are not among the available actions.
This requirement needs to be recursive, that is, themodal robustness of an
agent’s epistemic position must itself be unaffected by others’ actions, in
order for step three of the below argument to be valid. Lastly, lest the
assumption seems overly strong, for the purposes of my argument, “know”
only needs tomean that agents have true beliefs and have such a high level
of evidence that it does not make a difference to the verdicts of subjectiveThis content downloaded from 217.112.157.113 on May 04, 2016 06:25:13 AM
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AActConsequentialismwhether thetruebelief is treatedas factoronlyas true
with a probability depending on the agent’s evidence.
To establish the Induction Step, grant, for the sake of argument, the
following Induction Assumption: If a group of n agents gratuitously pro-
duces collectively suboptimal outcomes, then Modally Robust Act Con-
sequentialism finds fault with at least one of the group’s members. Now
consider a situation where n1 1 agents fall short of producing optimal
outcomes. By the above considerations, there is then at least one agent
a who has a potentially cooperative action Jc available to her but who
in fact performs another ðpotentially cooperative or uncooperativeÞ ac-
tion Ja. Now we can again ask whether a acts optimally by performing Ja
rather than Jc:ll use 1. If a’s performing Ja is not optimal, then according to Act Con-
sequentialism,a acts wrongly. A fortiori, Modally Robust Act Con-
sequentialism finds fault with a.
2. If a’s performing Ja is optimal, then it must hold that had a per-
formed Jc, the remaining n agents would not together have com-
pleted an optimal collective response that includes a perform-
ing Jc.
3. Now in this counterfactual situation, a doing Jc is held fixed ðas
it is the antecedent of the above counterfactualÞ. So we can
reduce this counterfactual situation to a choice situation of the
remainingn agents, while treating a doing Jc as an external pa-
rameter. So had a done Jc, the remaining n agents would have
been in a situation where they together failed to bring about
collectively optimal outcomes. Moreover, due to modally robust
knowledge, in this situation, they could not have been excused
due to ignorance of the actions of other agents, and their fail-
ure would thus have been gratuitous. Hence by the induction
assumption, Modally Robust Act Consequentialism would have
found fault with at least one of these remaining agents in the
counterfactual situation where a does Jc:
4. To see that Modally Robust Act Consequentialism also in fact
finds fault with at least one of these agents, consider an agent b
with whom Modally Robust Act Consequentialism would have
found fault if a had done Jc. Modally Robust Act Consequen-
tialism would have found fault with b for one of two reasons.
First, b would have acted suboptimally in the counterfactual sit-
uation where a does Jc. In this case, b would have acted wrongly
according to Act Consequentialism, and in the actual world, b
violates the Modal Robustness requirement of Modally Robust
Act Consequentialism. Second, b would have acted optimally
but would have been such that in the counterfactual situationThis content downloaded from 217.112.157.113 on May 04, 2016 06:25:13 AM
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All use where a does Jc, it holds that there is then at least one further
counterfactual combination of actions of the other n21 agents
to which b would not respond optimally. Modally Robust Act
Consequentialism would then find fault with b on grounds of
violating theModal Robustness requirement. Now take one such
counterfactual combination of actions, and add a doing Jc to it.
This gives us another possible combination of actions such that
it holds in the actual world that were this combination instan-
tiated, b would not respond optimally. Hence Modally Robust
Act Consequentialism in fact finds fault with the would-be cul-
prit.
5. So if a’s performing Ja is optimal, then Modally Robust Act Con-
sequentialism finds fault with at least one of the remaining n
agents.
6. Thus whether or not a’s performing Ja is optimal, Modally
Robust Act Consequentialism finds fault with at least one agent.The above argument gives us the Induction Step: If Modally Robust
Act Consequentialism identifies some moral fault in all situations where
n agents gratuitously fail to bring about optimal outcomes ðthe Induction
AssumptionÞ, then it also finds fault in all situations where n1 1 agents
gratuitously fail to produce collectively optimal outcomes. Now sinceMod-
ally Robust Act Consequentialism finds fault in all situations where n5 2
agents gratuitously fail to produce collectively optimal outcomes ðthe In-
duction StartÞ, by induction it also finds fault in all situations where any
number n ≥ 2 agents gratuitously brings about only collectively suboptimal
outcomes. Hence given modally robust knowledge, Modally Robust Act
Consequentialism accommodates On-the-hook in any such case with n ≥ 2
agents.
Note that the above proof makes no reference to details of the stra-
tegic choice situation of agents, and hence does not assume that the sit-
uation is a coordination problem like The Two Factories. It thus applies
to all cases where several agents together gratuitously bring about collec-
tively suboptimal outcomes and have modally robust knowledge about each
others’ actions. These cases then include situations of active frustration, as
in the market examples discussed in Sec. III.A.
VIII. LIMITATIONS AND RIVALS
Modally Robust Act Consequentialism is limited as a response to the
challenge of accommodating On-the-hook because the above general-
ization proof relies on the assumption of modally robust knowledge. In
this final section, I discuss cases where this assumption does not hold,
and contrast Modally Robust Act Consequentialism with a prominent
rival view which aims to do better.This content downloaded from 217.112.157.113 on May 04, 2016 06:25:13 AM
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AA. Knowledge and Synchronous Choice
The assumption of modally robust knowledge breaks down in cases
where agents cannot observe others’ actual behavior when making their
choices. Most notably, but by far not exclusively, agents face this situation
in cases of synchronous choice, like the following specification of The
Two Factories:
The Two Factories*: Ann and Ben synchronously decide to pollute3
episte
even
3
for m
the o
which
sibilit
assum
due t
variab
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H
nitive
ll use the river. When Ann makes her decision, she correctly infers from
Ben’s past conduct and expressions of intent that Ben will pollute
the river.Ann can here only base her decision on observation of Ben’s past con-
duct and expressed intentions. But if, contrary to her best predictions,
Ben were to produce cleanly, then there is no way for Ann to know about
this fact when she makes her choice.36 So all that Ann can do is to decide
whether or not to pollute, depending on her beliefs about Ben’s actions
but independently from what Ben in fact does. She thus cannot both be
such that she would act optimally were he to pollute and were he not to
pollute. So in The Two Factories*, Modally Robust Act Consequentialism
asks the impossible and hence cannot apply. Since modally robust
knowledge can never hold in situations of synchronous choice, my dis-
cussion of Modally Robust Act Consequentialism so far has implicitly
assumed that agents act in sequence.37
The standard way for Consequentialists to deal with situations with
limited information is to link rightness to expected consequences. The
Two Factories* shows that the same move is necessary for Modally Ro-
bust Act Consequentialism even in situations where agents in fact have
full knowledge of others’ actions but where that knowledge is not mod-
ally robust. Such Modally Robust Subjective Act Consequentialism re-
quires Ann both to pollute in the actual world and to be such that she6. I here assume that in the nearest possible world where Ben acts differently, Ann’s
mic position remains unchanged. I follow David Lewis by holding that this is possible
if it requires a “smallmiracle” ð“Causation,” Journal of Philosophy 70 ½1973: 556–67, 560Þ
7. Once we explicitly consider sequential choice, the following complication arises
y proof by induction: Those agents who get to choose earlier can determine not only
ptions faced by agents who get to choose later but might also influence the order in
others need to make their choices. In essence, my proof is unaffected by this pos
y, as it makes no reference to the specific order in which agents choose, and does not
e that this order is fixed. Instead, the proof only implicitly assumes sequential choice
o its reliance on modally robust knowledge. This assumption is compatible with a
le ordering of agents’ choices, and as long as this assumption is granted, the proof is
ected.
owever, cases with variable ordering of choices may well introduce significant cog
challenges for agents to obtain modally robust knowledge. It may then be unrealistic
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Awould pollute in the nearby possible world where Ben, contrary to her
predictions, produces cleanly. This result is consistent with an interpre-
tation of the principle via moral virtue: In The Two Factories*, the only
way for Ann to be such that she would act optimally in the counterfac-
tual situation where Ben produces cleanly is for her to produce cleanly
in the actual world. But given that Ben in fact does pollute the river, this
action of Ann’s would be strongly suboptimal in the actual world. When
morally good agents who care about the good are confronted with such
a choice between either acting optimally in the actual world or acting
optimally in counterfactual scenarios, they would act optimally in the
actual world.38 However, Modally Robust Subjective Act Consequential-
ism* cannot find any fault with Ann and Ben on the grounds that they
would not act optimally in counterfactual situations where the other fac-
tory owner produces cleanly. Hence this view does not accommodate
On-the-hook in The Two Factories*.
B. Co-operative Utilitarianism as Rival View
This limitation of Modally Robust Subjective Act Consequentialism
makes Donald Regan’s Co-operative Utilitarianism a particularly salient
rival view, as it is explicitly developed for cases of synchronous choice.
According to this view, agents ought to be cooperators who are willing to
do their part in whatever the best response of all cooperators turns out to
be. They further ought to follow a sophisticated procedure to identify
the other cooperators and the best response available to all cooperators
and to then play their part in this response.39 Since the ambition of Co-
operative Utilitarianism is to accommodate On-the-hook in synchronous
choice cases, it promises to be superior to Modally Robust Subjective Act
Consequentialism in these cases. However, as I argue in the following,
this promise remains unfulfilled, as Co-operative Utilitarianism tacitly
assumes a sort of sequential choice situation.
For Co-operative Utilitarianism to be applicable to cases like The
Two Factories*, it must be possible for Ann and Ben to satisfy its re-
quirements. Now identifying the other cooperators is not a purely men-
tal activity that agents can do all on their own before making their deci-
sions. Instead, it consists in approaching other agents with proposals for38. See Zimmermann, Moral Obligation, 266–68, for an analogous discussion with re-
gard to Zimmerman’s openness requirement.
to assume such beliefs, or, given the cost of obtaining such beliefs, the lack of such beliefs
could be factor that makes agents’ failure to produce optimal outcomes nongratuitous.
These situations then provide an intermediate class of cases between situations where
modally robust knowledge is plausible, and scenarios where it is impossible. I can here only
express the conjecture that the future approach to cases of synchronous choice which I
outline in the conclusion canbe adapted to these intermediate cases as well. I am indebted to
Donald Regan for pointing me to the possibility of variable orderings.
39. Regan, Utilitarianism and Co-operation, chaps. 8–10, esp. 148 and 153.
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Acollective strategies and in asking whether they would be willing to par-
ticipate. So if we apply Co-operative Utilitarianism in The Two Factories*
and other cases of synchronous choice, we implicitly assume that there is
a prior choice situation in which agents can communicate their willing-
ness and assess each others’ willingness to cooperate. If such a prior choice
situation is not given, Co-operative Utilitarianismmust bemodified to not
require an impossible identification of other cooperators. And just like
Modally Robust Subjective Act Consequentialism, such a modified Co-
operative Utilitarianism* is no longer guaranteed to accommodate On-
the-hook, because it can then easily be satisfied by agents like Ann and
Ben who in fact act optimally in The Two Factories* but cannot engage
in the process of identifying cooperators.
Furthermore, I contend that Co-operative Utilitarianism also does
not have an edge over Modally Robust Subjective Act Consequentialism
in situations of synchronous choice where prior communication is pos-
sible. This is because such prior communication allows agents not only
to carry out the procedures required by Co-operative Utilitarianism but
also to directly coordinate their actions.40 Applied to The Two Factories*,
agents then have a prior “coordination choice” to make, where they de-
cide what to do with their ability to communicate, followed by the orig-
inal synchronous “pollution choice,” which concerns their actions with
regard to the river.
Now if Ann and Ben first face a coordination choice, then Modally
Robust Subjective Act Consequentialism can also accommodate On-the-
hook: Suppose that Ann and Ben satisfy the requirements of Modally
Robust Subjective Act Consequentialism in both choice situations. Now
if in the pollution choice, they were confident that the other agent was
going to produce cleanly, then they would both produce cleanly. Con-
sequently, the best that Ann and Ben can do in the coordination choice
is to create that confidence in each other by agreeing to produce cleanly.
Since the coordination choice takes the form of a possible conversation,
it allows agents to act in sequence. The problems of synchronous choice
do then not arise, and we can assume modally robust knowledge of each
others’ actions. The subjective and objective forms of Modally Robust
Act Consequentialism then coincide, and we can then refer to the above
generalization proof and conclude that since Ann and Ben satisfy the
requirements of Modally Robust Subjective Act Consequentialism, they
will do the best they together can do in the coordination choice. Ann
and Ben will hence agree to produce cleanly and then follow through
with that agreement in the pollution choice and thereby produce col-
lectively optimal outcomes. Conversely, if they do not bring about col-
lectively optimal outcomes even though a coordination choice was avail-40. Again I am indebted to Krister Bykvist for this observation.
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Aable, then at least one of them violates the requirements of Modally Robust
Subjective Act Consequentialism. Hence under the assumption that Ann
and Ben face a coordination choice, Modally Robust Subjective Act Con-
sequentialism and Co-operative Utilitarianism both accommodate On-the-
hook.
My conjecture is that this result generalizes: Modally Robust Sub-
jective Act Consequentialism and Co-operative Utilitarianism* can ac-
commodate On-the-hook in the same cases, and so the limitations of the
former do not give support to the latter. Given the potential for exten-
sional equivalence of the two views, the main advantages of Modally Ro-
bust Subjective Act Consequentialism over Co-operative Utilitarianism
are the conceptual simplicity of the former and the possibility of moti-
vating it as a requirement of moral virtue.41
IX. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
I have shown how Act Consequentialists can find fault with some agent
in all cases where multiple agents who have modally robust knowledge of
all the relevant facts gratuitously bring about collectively suboptimal
outcomes, even if the agents individually cannot make any difference for
the better due the uncooperativeness of others. Act Consequentialists,
I have argued, can supplement their view of morally right action with a
basic requirement of moral virtue, which holds that agents ought to be
such that they act rightly not only in the actual world but also in counter-
factual scenarios where others act differently. The resulting Modally Ro-
bust Act Consequentialism correctly finds fault with agents who fail to be
morally virtuous in this respect and who thereby make collectively opti-
mal outcomes inaccessible to others.
The main limitation of my proposal is its reliance on the assump-
tion of modally robust knowledge, which breaks down in cases of syn-
chronous choice. I have sketched how despite initial appearances, the
competing view of Co-operative Utilitarianism fares no better than Mod-
ally Robust Act Consequentialism in such situations: I have conjectured
that both views can accommodateOn-the-hook in all and only those cases
of synchronous choice that are preceded by coordination choices, but
not in cases of isolated synchronous choice. A rigorous generalization of
this claim, however, needs to wait for a future essay.41. Regan argues that Co-operative Utilitarianism alone makes sense of Consequen-
tialist morality as a communal enterprise of all cooperators together ðUtilitarianism and Co-
operation, chap. 12Þ. Modally Robust Act Consequentialism, by contrast, remains firmly in-
dividualistic, and like Act Consequentialism treats the actions and dispositions of other
agents in the sameway as natural nonagential facts. I here have to leave it open if the insights
of both positions can somehow be combined or subsumed under one of the theories.
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AProvided that such a generalization is possible, the main limitation
of Modally Robust Act Consequentialism with regard to accommodating
On-the-hook is that it does not apply to isolated synchronous choice
cases where no prior coordination is possible. I contend that these cases
can be accommodated by making independent use of the above moti-
vation of Modally Robust Act Consequentialism via moral virtue. The
idea is to approach these cases by means of epistemic game theory:42 For
any choice situation with a set payoff structure, this approach first iden-
tifies those sets of pairs of agents and probability assignments on others’
actions for which universal satisfaction of Act Consequentialism is com-
patible with producing collectively suboptimal outcomes. For example,
in The Two Factories* without a prior coordination choice, Act Conse-
quentialism permits Ann and Ben to both pollute if they attach a prob-
ability of ≤ 1/3 to the other agent producing cleanly. For each of these
“epistemic profiles” of a possible situation, we then ask whether it is
explained by a moral shortcoming of some agent which can be captured
by the understanding of moral virtue advocated above ðe.g., if Ben is
known to be more likely than not to be uncooperative, because he does
not care about the good, or if Ann negligently did not acquire enough
information about BenÞ, or by mitigating circumstances which make col-
lectively suboptimal outcomes non-gratuitous ðe.g., if Ann mistakenly but
non-culpably believes that Ben is uncooperativeÞ. If it can be shown that
all problematic epistemic profiles can be explained by one of these fac-
tors, then Act Consequentialists can accommodate On-the-hook: The fail-
ure to bring about collectively optimal outcomes is then due to somemoral
shortcoming that Act Consequentialists can account for, or it is not gratu-
itous and no fault needs to be found. Developing this argument, how-
ever, is a task for yet another essay.
Finally, let me turn to the practical implications of my argument.
As argued in Section III.A, the most realistic real-world scenarios where
others’ uncooperativeness is known to agents are market situations with
price-inelastic supply or demand. Consider again the example of the rich
warlord who will buy a set number of weapons for almost any price. What
can Modally Robust Act Consequentialism say about the behavior and
dispositions of a weapons dealer who considers offering weapons to the
warlord? First, Modally Robust Act Consequentialism cannot say that
the dealer would act wrongly by offering the weapons if the number
of weapons offered by all dealers together is much greater than the war-
lord’s demand. Second, the dealer ought to be such that were not enough
others to offer their weapons, she would not offer them. At this point,
we need a further, hithertho-not-discussed requirement that I can only
stipulate here: a requirement to make sure that her cooperativeness is42. I am indebted to Christian List for helping me specify the approach I am after.
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Aknown to the other dealers. This requirement can be satisfied in mul-
tiple ways. For example, the dealer may sign a contract requiring her to
not offer her weapons if a given number of other dealers signs the same
kind of contract. But the most simple way to make her willingness to not
offer the weapons known is to simply not offer them in the actual world.
Withdrawing her supply then is not an act intended to make the world
better, but it is a communicative act by which the dealer signifies her
willingness to exclude the warlord from any kind of weapons supply.
This application to a more concrete case is, of course, extremely
sketchy. Further work is needed to justify a requirement not only to satisfy
Modally Robust Act Consequentialism but to also make that fact known
to others. Also, a requirement to make one’s cooperativeness known can
conflict with making the world better, for example, if one knows that
other agents are not interested in cooperating anyway and if making
one’s cooperativeness known is costly ðe.g., in terms of jobs lost in the
dealer’s companyÞ. The argument in this essay is hence only a very gen-
eral starting point for detailed discussion of concrete cases. The impor-
tant general lesson of my argument is that we need to evaluate not only
agents’ actual actions but also the actions they would perform if others
acted differently and that, at least under favorable epistemic circum-
stances, such an extended moral evaluation captures all the moral facts
needed to direct groups of agents toward collectively optimal outcomes.This content downloaded from 217.112.157.113 on May 04, 2016 06:25:13 AM
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